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1. Introduction
My focus will be on three concepts in Wohlrapp’s deeply engaging book: orientation (briefly),
justification, and truth (briefly).
2. Orientation
Wohlrapp uses the term ‘orientation’ to designate what he calls “the pragmatic function of theses
and theories” (p. 51). Theses are linguistic entities (sentences, propositions, speech acts, etc.) but
primarily they are “new orientations” (p. lix). The ultimate goal of argumentation is to assess the
validity of theses – that is, to determine whether they are reliable orientations (ibid.). A valid
thesis is one that has been sufficiently backed by argumentation (p. xxxii). Only in a praxis does
“the extent of the validity of a thesis” become apparent (p. lx). “A thesis is valid if it can be
justified in such a way that no objections remain” (p. lxi).
Theories, as Wohlrapp understands them, are “verbal formations that open up any domains
of reality at least to the extent that people are now able to act within them” (p.vi). They have the
pragmatic function of providing practical orientation, and the validity claim that accompanies a
theory is that the theory provides such orientation (p. 37). If this claim “has been satisfied in a
particularly closed way” both theoretically and practically, even though “only for the time
being,” then it is knowledge (ibid.).
3. Justification and truth
“Someone who possesses a knowledge K ‘knows’ any set of propositions p1 - pn if he believes
them to provide reliable orientation based on a justification that utilizes K and if this belief is
usually not disappointed” (p. 44). This is a pragmatic concept of knowledge; it requires a concept
of justification, but it “does not require a concept of ‘truth.’ Instead, it provides the concept of a
regularly reliable orientation which is derived from knowledge” (ibid.). But Wohlrapp adds:
“Everything that could be formally derived from knowledge may then be termed ‘true’ or ‘a
truth’” (ibid.).
Suppose that on the basis of a justification that utilizes knowledge K, S believes that
proposition p provides reliable orientation, and suppose that this belief is usually not
disappointed. Then, if S’s belief could be said to be formally derived from knowledge inasmuch
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as it is based on a justification that utilizes knowledge, it could be said to be true, and so in this
way there would be a link between justification and truth.
A justification, as Wohlrapp understands it, has two components: a base and a transition
from the base to a thesis.
The base is epistemic theory, “no matter how rudimentarily crafted” (p.144). Epistemic
theory encompasses “knowledge, practical experience, and solid particular beliefs” (p. 2), and
already functions as orientation in the actions and lives of the participants (p.144). The
participants comprise, at a minimum, a person who provides the justification and a person to
whom the justification is addressed.
The transition in a justification is an “inferential step” supported by theory. The supporting
theory is a material conditional sentence that “refers to action opportunities,” and it serves as a
warrant for the inference (p. 145).
The transition component of a substantial justification must include “elements of
construction” (p. 148). These elements are either formal, as in logic and mathematics, or, “more
typically, semiformal” (ibid.). Semiformal elements of construction are argumentation schemes
which “can be analyzed as ‘if… then’ sentences that are relevant to questions of validity under
certain specifiable conditions” (ibid.); for example, generalizations, slippery slope arguments,
and arguments from analogy.
A justification has “a subjective side” (p. 151). The addressee may understand the step(s)
in the justification, and may gain the insights “that are articulated by the thesis” (ibid.). But
Wohlrapp says that whether she then follows her insights by acting “is not specified by the
concept of justification as [he has] proposed it” (ibid.).
He also says that the concept of justification he proposes “is reconcilable with almost
everything philosophers currently say about justifications” (p. 142). This is a striking claim, and
in light of it I am going to consider whether Wohlrapp’s concept of justification is reconcilable
with an account of interpersonal justification given by the philosopher Alvin Goldman.
Goldman’s account builds on an epistemological account of good argument very similar to
one given by Richard Feldman. Goldman’s account is the following:
An argument is a good argument [epistemologically] relative to a person S if and
only if:
(i) S is justified in believing the conjunction of all the premises of the argument,
(ii) the argument is either valid or inductively strong, and
(iii) S is justified in believing that the premises are “properly connected” to the
conclusion. (Goldman 1995, p. 57)
Goldman distinguishes two senses of interpersonal justification (IP-justification). He says
that “there is a justification-creation sense of IP-justification, which only requires that the
speaker create [personal] justification in the hearer, and a justification-transmission sense of IPjustification, which requires that the speaker herself have [personal] justification for [a
proposition Y], which she transmits to the hearer” (ibid., p. 59).
Goldman defines transmissional IP-justification as follows:
Speaker S IP-justifies proposition Y to hearer S* (in the justification-transmission
sense) if and only if:
(i) S presents an argument A to S*, of which Y is the conclusion,
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(ii) argument A is an (epistemologically) good argument relative to both S and S*,
and
(iii) S* comes to believe Y by inference from the premises of A and appreciation of
the proper connection between premises and conclusion. (Ibid.)
Goldman also defines creational IP-justification; his definition is the same as his definition
of transmissional IP-justification, except that there is no reference to speaker S in clause (ii). A
speaker who creates IP-justification in another person might not herself have personal
justification for the proposition concerned. I think Wohlrapp would regard his account of
justification as an account of transmissional IP-justification, but if he would consider it an
account of creational IP-justification this wouldn’t make a significant difference for a response to
the reconcilability question, to which I now turn.
First, a definitional point. In one sense, to reconcile two things is to make or show them to
be compatible (NODE 1999). Thus, theory of justification A is reconcilable with theory of
justification B if A and B can be shown to be compatible, or if A and B can be made compatible.
Wohlrapp’s reconcilability claim would permit him to say (supposing he believed this to be true)
that his account of justification is in the indicated sense reconcilable with “almost everything”
Goldman says about IP-justification. Is it? I will consider some matters that bear on this
question, and conclude with a provisional judgment.
(a) Wohlrapp says that his concept of justification is “pragmatic and dialogical…. [I]t
construes the potential certainties that can be generated by an argumentative justification as
resulting from a practical basis. Moreover, it includes the notion of examining a thesis by way of
a critical dialogue” (p. 142). Wohlrapp makes these remarks immediately after making his
reconcilability claim; thus, he evidently doesn’t regard them as undermining that claim. And they
don’t necessarily undermine it, for a pragmatic and dialogical account of justification might be
compatible with an account that is neither pragmatic nor dialogical.
Goldman’s account of IP-justification is such an account. It’s not pragmatic; rather, it’s
epistemic. And it’s not dialogical. Nevertheless, Goldman could grant that a basic premise in an
IP-justification (i.e., a premise not supported in the argument itself) might, depending on its
content, count as a theory in Wohlrapp’s sense, have a practical basis, and be considered to be, in
Wohlrapp’s terms, an orientation for a new domain (p.147), and he could grant that the same
might be true of the conclusion of an IP-justification. Goldman’s account doesn’t include the
idea of examining a thesis in a critical dialogue, or, then, the idea, emphasized by Wohlrapp, of
defending justifications against objections in critical dialogue and revising them if necessary (p.
lxi); but Goldman’s account accommodates inductive arguments, and, as James Freeman has
written, one way to test an inductive argument “is to bring objections against it” (Freeman 1993,
p. 230).
(b) According to clause (i) in Goldman’s account of transmissional IP-justification,
proposition Y is the conclusion of an argument. For Wohlrapp, a justification justifies a thesis. In
his view, “a thesis and a conclusion differ in their pragmatic function. The thesis claims to be
suitable as a new orientation. In the conclusion, this claim is satisfied if this is made possible by
the proposed argumentation” (p. 134). It doesn’t follow from the latter sentence that a thesis
supported by argument counts as a conclusion only if the claim made by the thesis is satisfied by
the argument. This being so, Wohlrapp is free to call a thesis supported by argument the
conclusion of the argument that supports it.
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(c) Goldman’s account of IP-justification requires that the speaker and hearer be justified
in believing the conjunction of the premises of the justificatory argument – that is, justified in
believing their conjunction to be true. Wohlrapp, on the other hand, might say that if a
justificatory argument is to succeed, the addressee must be justified in believing that the
argument’s premises provide reliable orientations. Here there would be a difference between
Wohlrapp’s account and Goldman’s, but not necessarily incompatibility. A related point is this.
A successful Wohlrappian justification will show that the validity claim raised by the thesis,
namely that the thesis provides a reliable orientation, is true unless subsequent critical dialogue
shows otherwise; so here there is a link between Wohlrappian justification and truth.
(d) For Goldman, an argument in which speaker S successfully justifies proposition Y to
hearer S* is either valid (meaning deductively valid) or inductively strong. In Wohlrapp’s view,
“justifications … may contain deductive steps, [but] these are non-compelling overall” (p. 146).
Deductive reasoning, he holds, merely transforms existing knowledge; it doesn’t produce new
knowledge (p. 147). As for ‘induction,’ Wohlrapp thinks that this term “is no longer a suitable
designation for justifications that are constructive and substantial” (p. 146, n. 25). He prefers the
term ‘epagogic.’ Epagogic justifications “lead (our understanding) from the assumed basis to the
thesis in question” (p. 146). But this view allows Wohlrapp to hold that successful epagogic
justifications provide strong but nonconclusive support for their conclusions, if they aren’t
defeated by objections. And this makes them inductively strong.
(e) Goldman’s account of IP-justification requires that S and S* be justified in believing
that the premises of the argument concerned are “properly connected” to conclusion Y and that
S* come to believe Y by inference from the premises and appreciation of their “proper
connection” to Y. Wohlrapp’s account permits the requirement that for a justification to be
successful the addressee be justified in believing that the transition from base to thesis is
warranted by the theory that supports it and that, consequently, base and thesis are “properly
connected”; Wohlrapp’s account also permits the view that the addressee comes to believe the
thesis by inference from the base and “appreciation” of the “proper connection” between base
and thesis as judged by what Wohlrapp would take to be appropriate standards of assessment.
Here too there is compatibility between the two accounts.
(f) Goldman’s account allows the view that the conclusion of an IP-justification may be
false, for if the argument is inductive the conclusion may be false even if the premises are true.
Does Wohlrapp’s account allow the view that the thesis which is the conclusion of a justification
may not be valid – that is, may not represent a valid orientation? Perhaps not, for Wohlrapp says
that a justification “demonstrates the validity of a thesis” (p. 152; italics added). But here
Wohlrapp is using the term ‘justification’ as a ‘success’ term, such that a justification necessarily
succeeds in justifying its thetic conclusion. In another sense, however, to justify a thesis is
simply to provide reasons in support of it. A thesis which is in this sense justified might not be
valid – it might fail to represent a valid orientation. This is certainly possible on Wohlrapp’s
view that justifications are epagogic, hence nonconclusive. Indeed, it seems that Wohlrapp must
accept that the thetic conclusion of a justification need not be a valid orientation, because in his
view such a thesis might be refuted by subsequent objections made in critical dialogue.
4. Conclusion
These considerations lead me to think that, so far at any rate, we have no reason to believe that
Wohlrapp’s concept of justification is not, in the relevant sense, reconcilable with almost
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everything Goldman says in his account of transmissional interpersonal justification. But this is
a provisional judgment, to be defended, if it can be, against objections that Wohlrapp, for one,
may well raise against it.
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